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and controlling question ... is, was his employment discontinued
voluntarily by [claimant] ... or his authorized agent?" Despite this
emphasis on the test of voluntariness, the court refused to hold
claimant disqualified. This interjects new elements into the test of
qualification. First, the court by distinguishing the Reynolds9 case
has made it known that before an employee's voluntary acceptance
of a plan through collective acquiescence will be construed as his
own acceptance, the employee must be represented by at least a
truly representative employees' association. Further adjudication
must be had before the bench and bar will know the full extent
of this requirement. Second, the court alluded to the fact that there
was no pension provided for by the retirement plan. While it is
probable that the court mentioned the absence of a pension as a
factor militating against a conclusion of voluntary acceptance of
the plan by claimant, it might well prove that the absence of bene-
fits under a retirement plan will become prima facie evidence of
involuntary unemployment by the retired employee. It is interesting
to note that a majority of the courts which have considered the
issue have ruled that a retired employee receiving pension benefits
is not at the same time eligible for unemployment benefits.' 0
The present law in Kentucky on the issue of a mandatorily re-
tired employee's qualification under KRS 341.370(2)(c) is a com-
bination of Reynolds, Kroehler, and Young. It is submitted that
while the court correctly decided the issue before it in the Young
case, the loose language concerning the claimant's representation
by the committeemen and the absence of a pension plan has cast
doubt upon the heretofore established test of voluntariness. Any
future litigation to resolve the doubt could have been avoided by a
closer compliance with the previously established test.
William R. Harris
CONsTIrUTIoNAL LAw-CoNNEIcCuT STATUTE FoBIDING Tm USE OF
ANY DRuG, MEDICINAL ARTICLE OR INSTRumT FOR THE PURPOsE oF
PREVmN G CONCEPTION STRuCK DowN.- Appellants Griswold and
Buxton,. the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut and the League's Medical Director respectively, were
arrested as accessories for giving information and advice to married
persons and for prescribing the best contraceptive device or ma-
9360 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1962).
'OAnnot., 32 A.L.R.2d 901 (1953).
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terial. A Connecticut statute made it a crime for any person to use
any drug, article or instrument for preventing conception.1 Appellants
contended that the assessory statuteP as applied to them violated the
fourteenth amendment. They were, however, subsequently found
guilty as assessories, and the appellate division of the circuit court
affirmed. The court of errors then affirmed that judgment. The case
was brought on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Held:
Reversed. (6-2 opinion, Justice Clark not sitting). Delivering the
opinion of the Court, Justice Douglas found that the right to marital
privacy lay somewhere along the periphery of the Bill of Rights
and that this right is made applicable to the states by the force
of the first, fourth, fifth and fourteenth amendments. In attempting
to ground the right to marital privacy in the Bill of Rights, Justice
Douglas said: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy .... 3The
present case . . . concerns a relationship lying within the zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees."
4
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
On at least two major occasions litigation regarding the consti-
tutionality of the Connecticut contraception statute had wound its
way to the Supreme Court only to see the complaints dismissed
either for want of justiciable controversy or standing.3 When, how-
ever, appellants were arrested as assessories, found guilty, and fined
one hundred dollars each, "that real controversy flare[d] up,"6 and
the constitutional question had to be faced. In Griswold, appellants
were not merely representing married persons who had not been
(nor were about to be) injured;7 they had been injured and were
allowed to represent married persons whom they had aided and
abetted in violating a statute the constitutionality of which was
challenged. Having finally surmounted the barriers of justiciable con-
troversy and standing, the Court was prepared to take a giant stride
toward the invalidation of state criminal legislation.
1 General Statutes of Connecticut, § 53-32 (1949).
2 General Statutes of Connecticut, § 54-196 (1949).
3 Three key phrases in the opinion of the Court are worthy of e. lanation.
These phrases, 'zones of privacy," "penumbra," and "peripheral rights," are
often interchangeable. Technically, however, the penumbra is the partially
illuminated area beneath either the shelter of an amendment or, perhaps, the
shelter of the Bill of Rights as a unit. A zone of privacy is a specific area along
the edge of the penumbra. And a peripheral right, for the purposes of Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, lies on the edge of the zone of privacy and thus on the
edge of the penumbra.
4 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, 485 (1965).
GPoe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Tileston v. Ullman; 318 U.S. 44
(1943).
6 Poe v. Ullman, supra note 5, at 509.7 Compare Poe -. Ullman supra note 5, with Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S.
44 (1943). (Continued on next page)
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Reaching the merits of a case that was perhaps long overdue,
Justice Douglas did little more than deliver into law a position
which he had proffered in an earlier dissent. 8 It is well established
that the freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations are
peripheral first amendment rights.9 Furthermore, Justice Douglas
found that the Court has safeguarded the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life against all governmental invasions through
the protection of the fourth and fifth amendments.' 0 Since the concept
of privacy has frequently been read into the Bill of Rights and
extended to include the privacy of association, the sanctity of a man's
home, and even the right to marry and bring up children," Justice
Douglas was clearly justified in concluding that the right to marital
privacy was one of those "peripheral rights [without which] the
specific rights would be less secure."'2 While the right to marital
privacy, like other privacy rights, comes within the penumbra of
the Bill of Rights, Douglas failed to point out the specific amend-
ment under which the right to marital privacy falls. Does the Bill
of Rights as a unit have a single penumbra, and does the right to
marital privacy lie somewhere along the periphery of this penumbra?
Or, more logically, do all (or some) of the first eight amendments
have separate penumbras? If not all, which ones? The crucial ques-
tion is ultimately this: if all (or some) of the first eight amendments
have separate penumbras, under which ones-or one-does the right
to marital privacy fall? These are questions that the opinion never
satisfactorily answered. What force, then, has suddenly given the
Douglas opinion a thrust that it never before had enjoyed?
While dredging for the right to marital privacy in the Bill of
Rights, Justice Douglas quite fleetly tacked along the course of the
ninth amendment. By providing that "the enumeration in the Con-
stitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people," the ninth amendment indi-
cates that Justice Douglas' "zones of privacy" were truly anticipated.
The ninth amendment, then, simply clinched the argument that the
Bill of Rights (or its amendments) contained a penumbra which
concealed various zones of privacy. Why did Justice Douglas not say
more about the ninth amendment and thereby bring it to the fore
in the Court's opinion for the first significant time in such litigation?
Did he only light upon it because he knew that the Court had been
8 Poe v. Ullman, supra note 5.
9 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
1oBoyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
"1 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
'
2 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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steering toward the "zones of privacy" argument simply through
logical extensions of the first eight amendments anyway? Or did he
merely elect to recede into the judicial background and permit
Justice Goldberg to carry the argument along?
To the delight of at least one legal scholar,'3 Justice Goldberg,
whom the Chief Justice and Justice Brennan joined, rendered a de-
tailed reading of the ninth amendment. Without the Goldberg
opinion the application of the ninth amendment in the Court's
opinion palls upon the ear of an inquisitive legal mind. In noting
that the Court has found fundamental personal rights and liberties
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
from impairment by the states,' 4 and that these rights include even
"the right . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children," 5
Justice Goldberg stated that a fair interpretation of the ninth amend-
ment is really the constitutional fountain from which all such rights
flow: "The Ninth Amendment simply shows the intent of the Con-
stitution's authors that other fundamental personal rights should not
be denied such protection or disparaged in any other way simply
because they are not specifically listed in the first eight amend-
ments."16 The right to marital privacy, then, falls within a penumbra
of the Bill of Rights. But does this right fall within a penumbra of
the Bill of Rights as a unit, or does it fall within the penumbra of
a specific amendment? In saying that "my conclusion that the con-
cept of liberty is not so restricted and that it embraces the right of
marital privacy though that right is not mentioned explicitly in the
Constitution is supported by numerous decisions of this Court . . .
and by the language and history of the Ninth Amendment,"' 7 Jus-
tice Goldberg indicated that the right to marital privacy falls within
the penumbra of the fifth amendment. While the fourth, and per-
haps even the first, may be extended to include various privacy rights,
the ninth amendment encourages the Court to read the fifth amend-
ment more liberally and to find that the concept of liberty within
that amendment contains a penumbra under which the right to
marital privacy lies. The question now becomes this: Is Justice Gold-
berg's holding that the Connecticut statute violates the fifth amend-
ment as it is incorporated into the fourteenth amendment in align-
ment with the holding of the Court?
13 See Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights ... Retained By the People," 37
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 787 (1962).
14GiloV v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
15Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).16 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 492 (1965).
17 Id. at 486-87.
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If the Goldberg reading of the Court's opinion were a proper
clarification of the fuzzy holding of the Court, a significant pro-
jection of Griswold might well be made. Contrary to dictum in
the Court's opinion, invalidation of a state's regulation of the manu-
facture and sale of contraceptives, for example, might become pos-
sible. State legislation compelling the sterilization of recidivistic
sexual offenders (especially those who are married), moreover, might
never be constitutionally acceptable. And, again contrary to dictum,
state statutes prohibiting miscegenation might be struck down. But
Justice Goldberg's reading of the Court's opinion is clearly too nar-
row. Although Justice Douglas failed to locate the right to marital
privacy in a specific amendment, he indicated that he dealt not with
just a right to marital privacy but with a right to "privacies of life,"18
and such privacies might well be derived from the penumbra of each
and every amendment. If this is the proper reading of the Court's
opinion, the results could be cataclysmic. First, the surge of the
ninth amendment is forestalled because, rather than encouraging a
broad reading of the liberty concept in the fifth amendment, it
simply is just another sentence in the Constitution that allows the
Court to see the privacy concept in the first, fourth, fifth, and per-
haps other amendments-a vision that the Court had had without
the aid of the ninth amendment. Instead of toughening up the
liberty concept in the fifth amendment, the ninth amendment there-
fore becomes nothing more than one of number of guidelines in a
particular case. Secondly, the holding becomes so broad and un-
wieldly that it will prove inapplicable when the Court is faced
with finding a "privacy of life" other than a marital privacy in the
Bill of Rights. If, for example, the Court were faced with the problem
of invalidating a state criminal statute which invaded a first amend-
ment privacy, Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren (to say
nothing of Justice Stewart, who dissented in Griswold) might well
be unwilling to invalidate such a statute under Griswold for two
reasons. First, Griswold does not clearly hold that the Connecticut
statute violated the first amendment. And, secondly, they "have
not accepted the view that the 'due process' as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment includes all of the first eight Amendments." 9 But,
by joining Justice Goldberg, they have accepted the view that the
due process of the fourteenth amendment totally incorporates the
explicit rights of the fifth amendment and all other rights that are
implicitly contained in that amendments liberty concept. There-
18 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
19 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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fore, if the opinion of the Court had been more closely aligned
with the somewhat more narrow opinion of Justice Goldberg (an
opinion which, incidentally, should surely be less distasteful to Jus-
tices White and Harlan), the hypothetical statute which, as men-
tioned above, invaded a seeming first amendment privacy might
well be found to invade the liberty concept of the fifth amendment
as broadened by the ninth amendment.
For its failure to locate the right to marital privacy within the
penumbra of a specific amendment, the Court's holding may prove
to be too unwieldly to be useful in future litigation. But, while this
onission causes an incomplete utilization of the ninth amendment,
the Court's holding that the right to marital privacy lies somewhere
on the periphery of the Bill of Rights will perhaps prove to be quite
strong in itself, for marital privacy encompasses a multitude of
fundamental privacies that have heretofore gone unrecognized. Mari-
tal privacy, however, has become a unique right, one separate
from a greater right-"the right to be let alone.":'2 It seems that the
Court's opinion may have laid the groundwork for the future interpre-
tation that the right to be let alone was the right which was actually
invaded in Connecticut.
George C. Piper
TonTs-LnirrAION OF ACmIONS-EsTrOPPEL.- Appellants were involved
in an automobile collision with appellee's insured. An insurance
adjuster, appellee's agent, visited appellants three times within the
next four months. The claims of the parties are in conflict, but ac-
cording to appellants, the adjuster told them that appellee would
take care of everything, that he wanted them to get well, and that
they should call him when they determined the amount of their
expenses. Appellee never paid appellants' expenses. More than one
year after the collision, the appellants brought suit, and the appellee
relied on the Kentucky one-year statute of limitations.' Appellants
maintained that appellee should be estopped to plead the limitation,
in that appellee had obstructed the prosecution of the action within
the one-year period. 2 The trial court dismissed appellants' claim.
Held: Affirmed. Appellants are presumed to know that their action
will be barred after one year. They had no right to rely on the
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
IKy. Rev. Stat. 413.140 (1) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
'Although there is a statute covering this matter, KRS 413.190 (2), it is
vaguely worded and is always construed in light of the common law.
1966]
